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Abstract. Eugenio Regazzini was born on August 12, 1946 in Cremona
(Italy), and took his degree in 1969 at the University “L. Bocconi” of
Milano. He has held positions at the universities of Torino, Bologna and
Milano, and at the University “L. Bocconi” as assistant professor and lec-
turer from 1974 to 1980, and then professor since 1980. He is currently
professor in probability and mathematical statistics at the University of
Pavia. In the periods 1989–2001 and 2006–2009 he was head of the Insti-
tute for Applications of Mathematics and Computer Science of the Italian
National Research Council (C.N.R.) in Milano and head of the Depart-
ment of Mathematics at the University of Pavia, respectively. For twelve
years between 1989 and 2006, he served as a member of the Scientific Board
of the Italian Mathematical Union (U.M.I.). In 2007, he was elected Fellow
of the IMS and, in 2001, Fellow of the “Istituto Lombardo—Accademia di
Scienze e Lettere.” His research activity in probability and statistics has
covered a wide spectrum of topics, including finitely additive probabili-
ties, foundations of the Bayesian paradigm, exchangeability and partial
exchangeability, distribution of functionals of random probability mea-
sures, stochastic integration, history of probability and statistics. Overall,
he has been one of the most authoritative developers of de Finetti’s legacy.
In the last five years, he has extended his scientific interests to probabilistic
methods in mathematical physics; in particular, he has studied the asymp-
totic behavior of the solutions of equations, which are of interest for the
kinetic theory of gases. The present interview was taken in occasion of his
65th birthday.
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1. PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS AT
BOCCONI UNIVERSITY
Antonio: You received your degree in economics
from “L. Bocconi” University in Milano. Why did
you decide to study economics?
Eugenio: I enrolled in an economics degree essen-
tially because it was the only choice I had. Hav-
ing attended a Technical High School for Accoun-
tants, at the time the law did not allow students
from this kind of secondary school to study mathe-
matics at university, which would have been my fa-
vorite option. You needed to attend college prepara-
tory schools to enroll in subjects like mathematics.
My family could not afford my university studies
and I was expected to get a job right after com-
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pleting high school. The choice I made at the age
of 14 was coherent with this scenario. By the time
I got my diploma from high school, the situation
had improved a little bit and I could afford going
to university. This was also due to a financial aid
program, adopted by the farseeing Italian center—
left governments of the time, for students belonging
to economically disadvantaged families. The money
from this program (it was around 200 euros, per
year, in 1965) and the earnings deriving from private
lessons I used to teach to other students allowed me
to obtain a degree at Bocconi University.
Igor: Why did you choose Bocconi University and
not another university?
E: In the 1960s Bocconi was considered a presti-
gious university: a degree from it represented the key
for obtaining a good and rewarding job on the mar-
ket. These elements exerted an influence on me and
my family. However, there was also a practical rea-
son: Milano is just one hour by train from my home-
town, Cremona, and I could go back home every
weekend. Yet another reason is the influence of my
friend Lorenzo Peccati, a mathematical economist
from Cremona, who was a student at Bocconi while
I was still at high school. He was well aware of my
bent for mathematics and suggested a few advanced
textbooks where I started reading the mathemati-
cal tools used in economic modeling. In particular,
I was excited at reading the Italian translation of the
monograph Allen (1956) on mathematical analysis
for economists and this convinced me that Bocconi
would still have allowed me to study Maths.
I: This is a funny coincidence since I was con-
vinced by Lorenzo Peccati’s son, Giovanni, by now
a well-known probabilist, to enroll at Bocconi and
for precisely the same reasons. Where did your pas-
sion for mathematics come from?
E: I was very lucky at high school because I had
a brilliant maths teacher, Sidomo Vailati. He had
a variety of scientific and cultural interests and also
did consulting for a few private companies, thanks
to his unusual, at least in that period, knowledge
of statistics, probability and operations research. He
certainly was a self-taught man in the area of Stochas-
tics. At that time, probability and statistics, unlike
analysis, geometry and algebra, were not perceived
as relevant topics within mathematics degrees: they
were only present in a few optional courses. To my
knowledge, the only exception was the University
of Roma due to the presence of Bruno de Finetti.
In fact, this unfortunate situation lasted until the
1970s when the first full professors in probability,
apart from de Finetti, were recruited after national
competitions. Turning back to Vailati, it is worth
recalling that, among some courses for high school
teachers organized by the Italian Ministry of Educa-
tion, he also took a course in probability, which was
delivered by de Finetti. As a consequence, at the
age of 16 I was introduced to the realm of subjec-
tivism and learned the first elements of probability
and its applications. These first years of exposure to
de Finetti’s approach have stimulated an intellectual
and scientific interest that has certainly influenced
my later research.
A: How was the environment at Bocconi Univer-
sity in the years you have been there?
E: Bocconi had very few professors among its own
faculty and heavily relied upon adjunct faculty hold-
ing positions in other universities. These few pro-
fessors were all influential personalities of the time,
playing significant roles in the Italian social, polit-
ical and economic life of the 1960s. For instance,
Giovanni Demaria was a Paretian economist who
acted as economic consultant for the constituent as-
sembly that created the Constitution that lies at
the foundation of the modern Italian Republic after
World War II. There was also a special feeling be-
tween Bocconi and Milano, a city that had been able
to overcome the disasters of World War II and was
experiencing dramatic economic growth led by the
manufacturing sector. Bocconi looked to me, and
many others, as a vital part of Milano and con-
tributed to consolidate this process. Then, during
the last couple of years, the student protests of 1968
started. Despite being a private university, Bocconi
experienced serious clashes and some of its students
played an active role in the movement.
I: Did you like studying economics?
E: I was very fond of economics. The professors
I was interacting with were quite enthusiastic about
my inclination toward developing mathematical tools
useful for economic modeling. There is an episode
that occurred during my third year that I like to
recall. I was attending a course in Political economy
which included a series of seminars and one of them
concerned the relationship between the Italian Cen-
tral Bank and the Department of Treasury, which
at that time was the subject of a lively debate. For
an economic interpretation of the relationship be-
tween the two institutions, we were suggested to re-
fer to an article by Giorgio La Malfa and Franco
Modigliani; the latter was later awarded the Nobel
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prize in economics in 1985. The main contribution of
the paper was the proposal of a static model. Playing
a bit around with that model, I was able to derive
a dynamic version of it, which seemed in line with
the real situation in Italy. This was appreciated by
the other students and the teaching assistants. Also
in connection with the course on Public Finance,
I devised a model describing the evolution of cer-
tain taxing decisions. Overall, I think I had quite
a good economic intuition.
A: What did lead you to study probability and
statistics?
E: I was both impressed and fascinated by the first
year course in mathematics that was taught by Gio-
vanni Ricci. It was more advanced than a traditional
calculus course. The second year maths course, de-
livered by Giuseppe Avondo-Bodino, included also
a part devoted to probability, which actually cov-
ered essentially the same material nowadays taught
in first probability courses in maths degrees. During
the second year of my degree I also attended a course
on statistical Inference held by Francesco Brambilla,
which was important for my education. Finally, my
third maths course by Eugenio Levi contained some
probabilistic applications. This experience revived
my curiosity, dating back to high school, for founda-
tional aspects of probability. Moreover, I perceived
probability as a tough subject and therefore more
challenging and stimulating than others I was study-
ing.
I: What was the topic of your degree thesis?
E: I asked Avondo-Bodino to be my thesis super-
visor. He was a passionate Fisherian and hostile to-
ward the Bayesian paradigm: it might, thus, seem
curious that the title of my thesis was “The Bayesian
approach to hypothesis testing.” Indeed, he chose
that topic with the aim of proving the fallacy of the
Bayesian paradigm: this is revealed by the fact that
the potential of the Bayesian approach was going to
be assessed with respect to hypothesis testing prob-
lems that had already received well-established an-
swers within the frequentist framework. To be hon-
est, he did not even like the Neyman–Pearson ap-
proach: according to him, it introduced subjective
elements since it relied on decision theory. My task
was essentially to: (i) collect as much material as
possible on hypothesis testing, (ii) evaluate the pos-
sible impact of the Bayesian approach and (iii) es-
tablish whether it could be a sensibile alternative to
the frequentist approach. And my supervisor obvi-
ously expected a negative answer to the last ques-
tion.
A: And how did it work out? What were your first
impressions on the Bayesian approach?
E: While working on the thesis, I developed some
skepticism about the automatic implementation of
Bayes’ theorem, which was a legacy from Laplace
and his followers. However, my viewpoint was lim-
ited. In fact, writing the thesis was not an easy job,
especially because I could not rely on many sys-
tematic and exhaustive treatments. There were, of
course, de Finetti’s papers, but, given the unortho-
dox way they were written, I was not able to un-
derstand the connection between his theory and the
Anglo-American neo-Bayesian approach typically
adopted in papers appearing in statistics journals
at that time. De Finetti’s work did not follow the
standard Bayes–Laplace paradigm: in contrast, he
re-constructed it and recast it in a way to be coher-
ent with his approach to prediction. The books I re-
ferred to were Lindley (1965), Raiffa and Schlaifer
(1968) and, mostly, Ferguson (1967), which contained
a beautiful part on the Bayesian approach from the
viewpoint of Wald’s decision theory. The 1959 lec-
ture notes of de Finetti’s course at a Summer School
in Varenna [later translated in de Finetti (1972)] and
Savage (1954) were also helpful. I obtained a few mi-
nor results in terms of interpretation and compari-
son and also derived a “rule” for the choice of type-
I error probability α. As soon as I completed the
thesis, the monograph DeGroot (1970) appeared:
I found it very interesting and it proved to be very
useful for my statistical education.
A: One of your best friends and main coauthors
is certainly Donato Michele Cifarelli. Did you meet
him while studying at Bocconi?
E: Yes, he is actually 10 years older than me and
was my teaching assistant while I was attending
the statistics course. He delivered insightful lectures
where it was apparent that he had remarkable math-
ematical skills and also a deep knowledge of the book
by E. Lehmann. Therefore, it was quite natural to
seek his help when I started working on the thesis,
which required me to study also the frequentist ap-
proaches. His advice was very important, although
at the time he looked, at least to me, not interested
into the frequentist versus Bayes debate. I was im-
pressed by his vast knowledge of frequentist meth-
ods, both parametric and nonparametric, as well as
of probability theory and stochastic processes. I very
much liked the fact that he preferred fundamental,
though maybe difficult, at least for us, books to
much more immediate cookbooks. For instance, he
knew in great detail the celebrated monograph by
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J. L. Doob on stochastic processes. We have been
bound by a deep friendship and reciprocal esteem
ever since.
I: Who were other important scholars you met at
the time and who influenced your early approach to
mathematics?
E: Overall Bocconi was an intriguing place, at
least in Italy, for probability and statistics, given
these subjects were, as I said, almost absent from
most maths degrees. At the time Italian statistics,
and academia in general, did not have systematic
contacts with the international community and the
head of the Institute of Statistics, Brambilla, had the
merit of introducing and spreading the great devel-
opments in statistics and operations research, which
took place in the UK and the US. He had contacts
with foreign scholars: for example, he is also cited
by Leonard J. Savage in his 1954 book. At the heart
of these scientific activities was the Centre for Op-
erations Research, which, among its sponsors, could
count on Adriano Olivetti, an enlightened and revo-
lutionary entrepreneur of the time, who ran the com-
pany producing the celebrated typewriter “Lettera
22” now displayed at the Museum of Modern Arts
in New York City. His company is also well-known
for its pioneering contributions to the development
of personal computers. Among the various cultural
and scientific activities created and supported by
Adriano Olivetti, it is worth mentioning the jour-
nal “Tecnica e Organizzazione”: Brambilla was a co-
editor of the journal when de Finetti published an
important paper on the essentials of computational
techniques based on Monte Carlo methods, “Mac-
chine che pensano e che fanno pensare” (“Machines
that think and that make you think”). Brambilla
was a remarkable figure: he had been the assistant
of Ferruccio Parri who, besides being one of the first
Italian Prime Ministers after the war, was also im-
prisoned by the Germans during World War II since
he had been one of the antifascist opposition leaders.
A: What happened after you graduated?
E: I really enjoyed working on my thesis and I was
eager to continue, at least for some time, with re-
search. Ph.D. programs did not exist in Italy since
they were only introduced in the mid-1980s. So I was
doomed to the military service which was compul-
sory and would have lasted for 15 months. I tried
to postpone my entry for as long as possible, since
I wanted to compete for a scholarship from the Ital-
ian Ministry of University. Had I obtained it, I could
have freezed it until the end of the military ser-
vice. Thankfully my strategy was successful and,
when I was discharged in January 1972, I was able
to go back to university. After graduation and be-
fore starting the military service, I shared the office
at Bocconi with Cifarelli, and together we attended
various maths courses at the State University in Mi-
lano. I then sat the exams during my military ser-
vice, but in the end I did not complete a maths de-
gree, since I was already involved in developing my
own research and I was willing to publish! Nonethe-
less, those studies turned out to be very useful for
me.
2. FROM TORINO TO BOLOGNA, MILANO
AND PAVIA
I: Unlike many Italian academics, and more in line
with what happens abroad, you have been working
in many different universities. Was this important
for your professional development?
E: Definitely. In addition to working in various
universities, I also experienced very different envi-
ronments. It has been very helpful from both a sci-
entific and personal point of view. I met many statis-
ticians and mathematicians with very different back-
grounds. My first experience outside Bocconi was in
Torino: it was a small Department, most colleagues
were of my age and so it was pretty easy to settle
in. Afterward I moved to Bologna in a much larger
Department more in line with the Italian statistics
tradition. Then I got back to Milano: first at the
Mathematics Department of the State University
and, then, to Bocconi. Finally Pavia, which is one of
the oldest universities founded in 1361 and in a very
prestigious Mathematics Department of which I am
a proud member.
A: Tell us a bit about your first steps in the Italian
academia in Torino.
E: My supervisor, Avondo-Bodino, was full pro-
fessor in Torino and a lecturer at his department re-
signed and decided to leave the academia. Since they
needed a replacement, in December 1973 I moved
there with the concrete opportunity of obtaining,
later, a permanent position. Due to absurd bureau-
cratic reasons, I finally obtained an Assistant Pro-
fessorship only in 1978.
I: You obtained a full professorship position in
a national competition at a young age in 1980 and,
therefore, moved to Bologna which hosted one of
the few faculties of statistics in Italy. Then back to
Milano.
E: That was a time Italy was investing in univer-
sities, unlike now. Therefore, the career perspectives
were quite good also in the academia if you worked
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hard. Incidentally, the head of the selection commit-
tee was de Finetti, I must say a recurrent figure in
my life. In 1980 the only autonomous statistics fac-
ulties were Roma and Padova, whereas Bologna and
Palermo were offering statistics degrees but within
economics faculties. Statistics became a faculty in
Bologna only toward the end of the 1980s. In fact,
and in contrast to what happens outside Italy, facul-
ties are pivotal players in Italian academia, mainly
because they manage the recruitment. Now it seems
that things will change but, as we say in Italy, every-
thing changes so that nothing changes. Anyhow, in
Bologna I mostly taught probability courses, but my
ties to Milano were still strong, especially because
of my collaboration with Cifarelli. Therefore, I ac-
cepted the offer from the Mathematics Department
of the University of Milano in 1984, where they did
not have a faculty member doing research in prob-
ability and mathematical statistics until my arrival.
A key role for my transfer was played by an analyst,
Marco Cugiani, whom I also replaced as director of
a research institute of the C.N.R., nowadays the Mi-
lano branch of the Institute of Applied Mathematics
and Information Technology.
A: In 1989 you moved back to your beloved Boc-
coni University. Did you find any substantial changes
since the last time you had been there?
E: At Bocconi things had changed a lot, the most
apparent being that it had turned from an elite to
a larger and more open university with something
like 10,000 students. Hence, I think that some changes
were necessary. As for myself, I was in a somehow
privileged position since I was mostly teaching ad-
vanced and not compulsory courses, which were much
more challenging than most other courses. There-
fore, starting from a yearly basin of more than 2,000
students of very good quality, by self-selection I had
small numbers of students, who were highly moti-
vated and of the highest quality. I guess I have to
mention you two, will not I? But let me also mention
Chiara Sabatti and Giovanni Peccati, among many
others.
I: What convinced you to move to another univer-
sity in 1998?
E: During the 1990s, while I was there, an even
more radical reorganization was occurring: courses
of the type I was teaching were perceived as too
“aristocratic” and had too few students so that they
were doomed to be shut down. And the same des-
tiny was foreseen for the most challenging degrees.
In fact, when I moved back in 1989, I did it with
the aim of setting up a statistics degree: I was very
disappointed when the project was officially turned
down in 1997. Therefore, I decided that my experi-
ence at Bocconi was concluded and that I wanted
to move back to a maths department. Nonetheless,
I still have a special affective relation with Boc-
coni.
I: Then you moved to Pavia. And I followed you,
given I had just graduated from Bocconi and started
my Ph.D. in Pavia. It was a new challenge for you
at a mature age, was it not?
E: The only science faculty members and future
colleagues of mine in Pavia I knew in person, prior to
moving, were three brilliant mathematicians: Mau-
rizio Cornalba (we were both members of the scien-
tific committee of the Italian Mathematical Union),
Franco Brezzi (we got to know each other at the
meetings of the Italian National Research Council)
and Enrico Magenes. Enrico Magenes, who passed
away last November, shaped the department in its
current form and significantly contributed to its in-
ternational standing. When I moved, I was one of
only two probabilists and since then we have been
able to hire two additional Assistant Professors. Once
arrived, with great enthusiasm I immediately got in-
volved in the Ph.D. program and the outcome has
been rewarding, as also witnessed by the achieve-
ments of some former Ph.D. students.
A: Throughout your career you have been working
at faculties of science and economics, at public and
private universities. What environment do you think
better fits the needs of a researcher in probability
and statistical science?
E: I think that the ideal environment, relatively
to the Italian experience which is the only one I am
aware of, is a maths department which is open to-
ward the modern trends and research directions of
mathematics and therefore not too much bound to
traditional subjects like analysis, geometry and math-
ematical physics. And thankfully there are various
departments that comply with these criteria. How-
ever, I must admit I am a bit pessimistic about the
future: the Italian university system in general, and
departments involved in basic research in particu-
lar, are struggling and suffering due to the indis-
criminate financial cuts in recent years. These have
been implemented somehow light-heartedly by the
government since cuts in basic research funding are
unlikely, at least in Italy, to cause immediate social
upheaval. In fact, it would be important to abandon
the habit of uniformly distributed cuts and aim at
creating, or consolidating, niches of excellence. And
I have seen many such niches during my career.
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3. BAYESIAN INFERENCE
I: At the beginning of your academic career you
started working on inferential problems according to
the frequentist approach.
E:My interest in frequentist inference started soon
after completing my degree thesis and heavily bene-
fited from the collaboration with Cifarelli. And one
of the first topics we started working on was hypoth-
esis testing. Corrado Gini and other Italian statisti-
cians had introduced a considerable number of sum-
mary statistics that were originally used only for
exploratory data analysis to measure, for instance,
concentration, variability, dependence and similar-
ity between sets of data, and so on. Our idea was to
use such summary measures for inferential purposes
and, specifically, as test statistics for studying de-
pendence in nonparametric problems. An early con-
tribution in this direction was achieved by Cifarelli
(1975) who studied the asymptotic distribution of
a statistic arising in a test of homogeneity for two-
sample problems. The paper contained a remarkable
result on the distribution of the integral of the abso-
lute value of the Brownian bridge. Our initial efforts
led to a paper (Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1974) that we
are very proud of: there we determine the limiting
distribution of a measure of monotone dependence
introduced by Gini. The program we set was very
appealing and consisted in checking whether these
statistics, when used for hypothesis testing, yielded
tests that were more efficient than those commonly
used at the time. For example, the index of mono-
tone dependence I was mentioning was compared
with Spearman’s ρ and with Kendall’s τ and in some
cases it featured better performances.
A:Around the mid-1970s you turned back to Baye-
sianism. What about your skepticism?
E: Yes, and my experience at University of Torino
was fundamental in this respect. The department li-
brary held the collection of all de Finetti’s papers,
well kept and easily accessible. I started looking at
contributions cited by Savage as decisive for the
foundations of the Bayesian paradigm. My curiosity
was fueled by the fact that, as I said, de Finetti’s
work appeared to me completely disconnected from
the Bayesianism I had studied on books and journal
articles. It was a challenging task since de Finetti’s
writing style, which was actually one of the main
aspects he was criticized for, was unorthodox and
sometimes seemingly cryptic. Nonetheless, hard work
and stubbornness finally allowed me to understand
why de Finetti introduced exchangeability and the
role such a form of symmetry plays in the recon-
struction he gave of the Bayes–Laplace paradigm.
This really opened my eyes on a new world provid-
ing a coherent and unified view of statistical infer-
ence, where subjective probabilities play an impor-
tant role. In fact, suddenly the subjective interpreta-
tion of probability was the only one that made sense
to me from both a philosophical and a mathematical
point of view.
I: You were then able to convince Cifarelli to enter
the realm of Bayesian statistics.
E: I have to say that Cifarelli shared my same
doubts on the foundations of the Bayesian approach
to statistical inference. However, after completing
my study program in Torino I pointed him to the
references where de Finetti was answering our ques-
tions and solving our doubts. Besides de Finetti’s
well-known papers, I had discovered many other “mi-
nor” contributions that were important for under-
standing the unified framework he had in mind. And,
after struggling to understand, I started to love his
style: entering his world had been very demanding,
but once I succeeded the reward was incomparable.
In his work one could find ideas, hints and concepts
whose expressive force was much more powerful than
a standard presentation of definitions, theorems and
cool mathematical technicalities. Spurred by the en-
thusiasm, I had been able to convince Cifarelli and
we started working together in this direction.
I: Is this when you started your research on Bayes-
ian nonparametrics?
E: In some sense, yes. On the one hand, we were
hoping to be able to tackle in a Bayesian setting the
same issues we had addressed within classical non-
parametric inference. On the other hand, we guessed
that our starting point should have been de Finetti’s
representation theorem as stated in de Finetti (1937a)
which we could consider as being nonparametric.
In this fundamental paper, the law of an exchange-
able sequence is described as a mixture on a space
of probability measures and the prior is the almost
sure limit, in a weak sense, of the empirical measure
generated by the data. This motivated the investi-
gation of random probability measures (rpm’s) for
statistical inference and might have led to extend
the Bayes–Laplace paradigm. We planned to con-
sider estimation of functionals of rpm’s such as the
mean, the variance or other characteristic parame-
ters of the unknown distribution. The necessary pre-
liminary step was to determine the posterior distri-
bution of these functionals. A helpful reference was
a short paper (de Finetti, 1935), where de Finetti
provides a reformulation in Bayesian terms of meth-
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ods used in exploratory data analysis for smooth-
ing the empirical distribution. Moving from this, he
basically addressed in a nonparametric framework
both the issue of prediction and of evaluation of the
posterior distribution on a set of probability mea-
sures. Unfortunately, we had no clue on how to de-
fine a probability distribution on a space of proba-
bility measures that would be analytically tractable.
Of course, we were not aware of T. S. Ferguson’s
paper (Ferguson, 1973). We were stuck and all the
attempts we made led us nowhere.
A: Was there any decisive event that helped you
overcoming these difficulties?
E: In 1976 I met Andrew L. Rukhin who had left
the Soviet Union and was in Italy just before mi-
grating to the US. We discussed our research activ-
ities and I described to him the technical problems
Cifarelli and I were dealing with. He suggested we
go through Ferguson’s paper in order to find an an-
swer to our questions. And, indeed, that was the
case: that paper allowed us to resume our project.
So we started considering linear functionals of the
Dirichlet process with the aim of determining their
probability distributions analytically.
A and I: Let us also recall that the study of the
Dirichlet process suited your passion for classical
music very well!
E: Gustav Dirichlet is associated with the distri-
bution because he evaluated the integral on the sim-
plex. The musical connection is that he married Re-
becka Henriette Mendelssohn, younger sister of Felix
Mendelssohn, the famous German composer.
I: Were there other Bayesians in Italy at the time?
E: A few years after its re-flourishing at an inter-
national level, due to the work of Leonard J. Sav-
age, the Bayesian approach was sort of rediscovered
in Italy as well. This may sound surprising given de
Finetti is Italian: however, one has to consider that
de Finetti only entered academia in 1946, at the
age of 40, when his research was already focused
on different topics. Interestingly, he had obtained
the position already in 1939, but could only start
his job in 1946 after the fall of the fascist regime
due to a law forbidding the appointment of unmar-
ried professors, as was de Finetti’s case. Anyhow, in
those years there was a large group led by Giuseppe
Pompilj in Roma and some scholars started to work
on Bayesian statistics, like Ludovico Piccinato. In
Roma there were also some of de Finetti’s students
like, for instance, Fabio Spizzichino. I should also
mention a group based in Trieste and coordinated
by Luciano Daboni, who started working under de
Finetti’s supervision soon after gaining his univer-
sity degree. Besides actuarial mathematics, they fo-
cused mainly on exchangeable processes and foun-
dational issues of Bayesian inference and, during the
years, I had many fruitful interactions with them.
A: Even if more interested in the Bayesian para-
digm, you did not avoid doing research based on
a frequentist approach. It seems you did not, and
still do not, see any ideological contraposition be-
tween Bayesianism and frequentism.
E: I have never seen this as an ideological con-
traposition. I think that ideological positions make
sense only outside the realm of mathematics. Any-
how, even when I was working on statistical prob-
lems according to the frequentist approach, I always
had the feeling that the Bayesian framework was far
more complete and logically sound. I was not en-
thusiastic about the automatic use of priors on un-
observable parameters: the subjective views I had
on probability were in conflict with such a treat-
ment of the Bayes–Laplace paradigm, as I believe
that inference must concern quantities that can be
empirically observed. But, on the other hand, the
Fisherian attitude appeared to me as too drastic,
because prior beliefs should play a role in statistical
inference. Once able to fully understand the conse-
quences of de Finetti’s results, I became convinced
that Bayesianism was the only acceptable way of
inductive reasoning.
A: Current developments in Bayesian inference in-
volve a heavy use of simulation algorithms. Do you
still think there is a need for putting a strong effort
in determining exact forms of Bayesian inferences
(or, at least, error evaluation when approximations
are used), even when these are difficult to use in
practice?
E: Computational techniques have been decisive
in making Bayesian models applicable to real world
problems and some recent applications I saw are
simply amazing. I definitely think that the advan-
tages they yield largely surpass some drawbacks as-
sociated with their uses. That said, I would still like
to make a point, which I think is important since it
has to do with how statistical modeling is conceived.
Indeed, models should be devised as simple as pos-
sible, while still preserving the capability of captur-
ing the essential features of the phenomenon under
study. Such a simplification could be achieved by
first detecting inessential elements and, then, drop-
ping them when it comes to the point of specifying
the model. This attitude is natural when one aims at
achieving exact estimates of the quantities of inter-
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est. However, if the need for pushing analytic results
as far as possible disappears, it is likely that the
models become more loose and unnecessarily com-
plex. Both parsimony and extreme care in the for-
malization of models are still important guidelines
for research: the only difference is that they now
need to be spelled out clearly, while they were im-
plicitly followed in the past. Another related and
important point concerns approximation. When ex-
act inferences are not possible, one should put some
effort in providing an upper bound to the error of
approximation yielded by the numerical techniques
that are used. I have tried myself to work in this
direction, for instance, in relation to approximating
the probability distribution of the mean of a Dirich-
let process. I know this is a challenging task, but it
cannot be avoided.
4. DE FINETTI AND THE INFLUENCE OF
DE FINETTI’S WORK
I: There is no doubt your research has been deeply
influenced by de Finetti’s work. Which was the first
paper of de Finetti you read through?
E: While I was completing my thesis at Bocconi
I came across his joint paper with Savage (de Finetti
and Savage, 1962). It contained a discussion on the
choice of the prior distribution and was mainly illus-
trative with no deep mathematics involved but still
evocative for a novice.
A: His most renowned piece of work certainly is
the two-volume book on probability theory, de Finet-
ti (1970). What else would you suggest to a student
who is willing to study and understand de Finetti’s
stance in probability and statistics?
E: I would certainly suggest de Finetti (2006), two
volumes containing selected papers by de Finetti,
which have been published by the Italian Mathemat-
ical Union in 2006 in occasion of the centenary of his
birth. The first volume is on probability and statis-
tics, whereas the second is on applied maths and on
the teaching of maths. As for his subjective views on
probability, one should refer to de Finetti (1931).
One should also read de Finetti (1937a). Another
important piece of work is de Finetti (1972). Fi-
nally, de Finetti (1992) contains a selection of some
of de Finetti’s papers with English translation. Un-
fortunately, some significant contributions, at least
to my knowledge, have been only published in Ital-
ian, such as those related to independent increments
processes and some others on the subjectivistic def-
inition and interpretation of probability.
I: As you just mentioned, the fact that he was
not writing in English hindered the circulation of
his ideas and results in the scientific community.
E: This is definitely true. For example, it is prob-
ably unknown to many that de Finetti introduced
the celebrated τ index a few years before Kendall
(de Finetti, 1937b). In 1939 he obtained some impor-
tant results on optional stopping: indeed, de Finetti
(1939) deals with the gambler’s ruin problem, where
one can also find an embryonic version of the Gir-
sanov theorem. Another important contribution was
the continuity theorem for characteristic functions:
he proved it in the appendix of de Finetti (1930a).
Besides these, it is worth listing a few other con-
tributions for which a priority to de Finetti should
be acknowledged: he completed what is now known
as the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem before Francesco
P. Cantelli in de Finetti (1933); in de Finetti (1940)
he devised a model that anticipated the portfolio
theory for which Markowitz was awarded the Nobel
prize; he proved the theorem on almost everywhere
nondifferentiability of the trajectories of the Brow-
nian motion in de Finetti (1929).
A: With reference to the de Finetti (1929) pa-
per, which is actually our favorite, should we not as
Italians propose Le´vy processes be called de Finetti–
Le´vy processes instead?
E: As I mentioned before, the answer is affirma-
tive. Indeed, de Finetti started from a more gen-
eral problem of providing the random counterparts
of a Volterra classification for the ordinary laws of
physics. In this context he identified processes with
independent and homogeneous increments as those
whose characteristic function satisfies the first of the
equations in Volterra’s classification, namely, X ′ =
f(λ). As a by-product, he also introduced implic-
itly the notion of infinite divisibility. In a subse-
quent paper, de Finetti (1930b), he further char-
acterized the class of infinitely divisible laws as the
class of distribution limits of compound Poisson pro-
cesses, thus providing a representation theorem for
infinitely divisible distributions. Le´vy was not aware
of de Finetti (1929) and resorted to a different ap-
proach to obtain more general and deep results. The
contribution by Khintchine to the well-known Le´vy–
Khintchine representation originates from a paper
published in 1937 (see Khintchine, 1937): Khint-
chine’s paper builds upon Kolmogorov (1932), where
Kolmogorov explicitly mentioned (even in the title
of the article) that he was resorting to the approach
set forth by de Finetti. So, yes, it should definitely
be de Finetti–Le´vy processes.
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I: And what were his connections with the broader
international scientific community?
E: His first international contacts, before gradu-
ating in mathematics at the University of Milano,
are related to a paper, de Finetti (1926), he wrote
on Mendelian inheritance, which had quite an im-
pact in biology. It was his first paper and appeared
on the Italian journal Metron. His results also at-
tracted the attention of Alfred J. Lotka and Jacques
S. Hadamard. The latter was so impressed by de Fi-
netti’s achievements that he suggested Georges Dar-
mois to study the paper, as witnessed by one of the
letters that de Finetti wrote to his mother in 1929
and that have recently been published by his daugh-
ter Fulvia. This research also originated the so-called
de Finetti diagrams that are extensively used in pop-
ulation genetics.
A: An important event at which de Finetti drew
attention on his research in probability was the In-
ternational Congress of Mathematicians (ICM),
which was held in Bologna in 1928.
E: That conference was definitely important for
the development of de Finetti’s interactions with
foreign scholars. On that occasion he presented his
first results on exchangeability and made contact
with Maurice R. Fre´chet, who later invited him to
the Institut Henri Poincare´ in 1935 and to the Col-
loque de Ge´ne`ve in 1937 where he then also met
Jerzy Neyman and others. He had frequent interac-
tions with Paul Le´vy and Aleksandr Khintchine, re-
spectively, on independent increment processes and
on the proof of the representation theorem for ex-
changeable sequences. He was also in contact with
Andrey N. Kolmogorov, as witnessed by the Kol-
mogorov (1932) paper on infinite divisibility whose
title contains an explicit reference to “A problem of
de Finetti.” Both Kolmogorov and de Finetti also
worked at the same time on the derivation of a repre-
sentation theorem for associative means, now known
as the de Finetti–Kolmogorov–Nagumo Theorem.
He also got in contact with many eminent math-
ematicians via mail. In fact, he used to have a note-
book in which he recorded to whom he had sent
which of his papers: de Finetti’s daughter, Fulvia,
once showed it to me and the names are impres-
sive. After World War II he had significant scientific
collaborations with Leonard J. Savage and Lester
Dubins and he interacted also with William Feller
and Abraham Wald.
I: Were his views on the subjective approach to
probability theory held in high regard?
E: In mathematics his work has been largely
ignored, and not only because of the subjective in-
terpretation. Indeed, the mathematical approach
yielded by such interpretation does not require σ-
additivity. In fact, finitely additive laws also become
admissible and the traditional measure–theoretic ap-
proach to probability theory represents obviously
a particular case. Countably additive probabilities
are coherent in de Finetti’s sense but are just a sub-
class of coherent laws. And de Finetti himself was
well aware that many results could have been neater
by assuming countable additivity. We may reason-
ably conjecture that his position in favor of including
finitely additive probabilities somehow put him off
from focusing on the particular countably additive
setup. This could explain, for example, why he did
not further investigate processes with independent
increments. It is to be noted that the framework for
his subjective approach had been settled by 1931
and, as evident from his published mail exchange
with M. Fre´chet, he fought for it for a while.
I: And what about the impact on statistical prac-
tice?
E: In Bayesian statistics references to subjectivism
are quite frequent, but I actually see little of de Finet-
ti behind them. First, in the subjective approach
also finitely additive laws are allowed and, therefore,
a proper subjectivist should try to analyze statisti-
cal problems in this setup. This point is very impor-
tant in the case where “transcendent” conditions—
such as convergence of sequences of random ele-
ments, forms of the corresponding limits, etc.—are
involved: one should, then, establish the extent to
which the conclusions depend on the specific σ-addi-
tive extension (usually unique) of the original finite-
dimensional distributions. Second, from an interpre-
tation point of view, subjectivism and objectivism
are often mixed up and Bayes theorem is applied
in an automatic way, whereas subjectivism would
require probabilistic statements to be made on ver-
ifiable events. Subjectivism seems more a kind of
catch-phrase than a real commitment. In my opin-
ion, the papers of L. J. Savage, L. Dubins, J. Pit-
man, P. Diaconis and D. Freedman are the ones that
adhere most closely to de Finetti’s views.
A: Did your convinced support of subjective prob-
ability affect the way you teach probability courses?
E: This represented a sort of dilemma through-
out my career. Focusing solely on de Finetti’s math-
ematical theory of probability would have implied
providing students with an unorthodox background
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in probability: it could have been an enrichment for
some of them but also a drawback for some others,
especially for those who needed to use probability
as a mere tool in other disciplines. Therefore, most
of the courses I taught were within the σ-additivity
framework. Nonetheless, I have always tried to il-
lustrate extensively some distinctive features of the
subjective viewpoint in one of my first lectures. This
was useful since it provided students with a more
complete picture of the subject and allowed them
to understand that the results I was going to state
and prove were valid on a special class of proba-
bilities sharing the property of countable additiv-
ity. Students were, then, aware that it was somehow
like teaching them a course in analysis that was just
about analytic functions! The connection with con-
ditional properties was far more difficult to point
out. As for the subjective interpretation, it is still
possible to preserve it even when confining to σ-
additive probabilities.
A: Can you provide some further insight on this
last issue?
E: The difficulty I am referring to arises due to the
fact that Kolmogorov’s definition cannot be seen as
a special case of coherent conditional probabilities.
In fact, the Kolmogorov approach lacks an appropri-
ate axiomatization and interpretation of conditional
probability: the definition is by means of a limit-
ing procedure. The perspective is then completely
different. For example, de Finetti’s approach nec-
essarily leads to conditional probabilities that are
regular and proper, whereas it is well known that
Kolmogorov’s definition does not. In order to grasp
these mathematical and conceptual differences on
conditional expectations and probabilities, one can
refer to the works by L. Dubins, David Blackwell,
Czeslaw Ryll-Nardzewski, William D. Sudderth, Ro-
ger A. Purves, Pietro Rigo, Patrizia Berti and also
myself.
I: Tell us about your meetings with de Finetti.
E: I first met him in 1969 at a summer course on
mathematical economics in Urbino. Since I was work-
ing on my thesis, I took the opportunity to ask him
a few questions about his paper with Savage (de Fi-
netti and Savage, 1962) I had read. He was not very
talkative and probably thought I was not understan-
ding anything. He was right, but I still went away
with the impression that it was not simple at all to in-
teract with him. Afterward I met him at some confe-
rences during the 1970s, but at that time he was not
working on statistics and probability with the same
intensity and creativity of the early days: he was
more inclined to elaborate on general philosophical
and foundational aspects. The only thing I can say
about our meetings is that I had the impression he
was interested in nontrivial and original approaches
or attitudes that to some other people might have
appeared as singularities. For example, in Bologna
he once told me he had been fascinated by the math-
ematical physics lectures held at the Polytechnic in
Milano by a lecturer, Bruno Finzi, whose assign-
ments were notoriously challenging and contained
exercises that Finzi himself could not solve. He re-
called the solutions he had been able to give were
very original and much appreciated by Finzi. He also
told me he had appreciated lectures on economics
of insurance companies delivered by Ulisse Gobbi at
the Polytechnic in Milano because they had been the
source of inspiration for the mathematical modeling
of many aspects of economics he had later investi-
gated. I am surprised by this, since in Gobbi’s work
I did not find any mathematical formalism.
A: He was also engaged in public life and gained
some popularity because of his political experience.
E: His political experiences can be well under-
stood if one refers to the environment where he grew
up. De Finetti’s family was wealthy and highly ed-
ucated. They were part of the Italian community in
territories of the Habsburg Empire, and his father
was an engineer working for the Austro-Hungarian
railway. During his childhood he had learned about
the irredentist ideas of the Italian minority that was
aiming at unification with Italy. Such aspirations
quite naturally developed into strong nationalist feel-
ings once the area became part of Italy. Moreover,
having been part of a minority, he developed a strong
sensitivity toward injustice in all respects and, there-
fore, also a strong criticism toward some social im-
plications of capitalism of the time. This blend of
ideas somehow naturally led him to support the ris-
ing fascist party: its initial political and social pro-
gram included a series of reforms whose goal was the
complete State control of the economy. As de Finetti
himself wrote a few years before dying, the direc-
tion of the whole economy, once freed from the ter-
rible tangle of individual and interest group selfish-
ness, should lean toward the collective achievement
of a Paretian “optimum” and should be further in-
spired by “fairness” criteria.
A: Hence, his support to fascism was mainly the
result of ideal feelings that were fueled by strong
social and economic views.
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E: This is further witnessed by the fact that af-
ter the fall of fascism, he sympathized with left-
wing movements without adhering to a large politi-
cal party. Finally, during the 1970s he started being
involved in important campaigns for civil rights and
for social justice. The Italian party that better fit-
ted his political thoughts of the time was the Radical
party.
I: Can you tell us something about it? It seems
that, while being involved in political activities set
forth by the Radical Party, he spent one night in jail!
E: In fact, he did not end up in jail because the or-
der to release him arrived before being imprisoned.
To make a long story short, he was editor of a news-
paper of the Radical Party, which was publishing
letters of conscientious objectors who refused to per-
form the compulsory military service. This was ille-
gal at the time. The day he learned he was going
to be arrested, he asked the police whether it was
possible to arrest him at the Accademia dei Lin-
cei, the most prestigious Italian science academy,
where he was going to have an official meeting the
day after. He motivated such a seemingly bizarre re-
quest with the fact that the police could have saved
some money by not picking him up by car at home:
the Accademia dei Lincei building was, indeed, just
a few steps away from the prison he was supposed
to go to. However, the order to release him arrived
as soon as he got to jail. This episode had a huge
echo in the press.
A:We also recall a story you told us about Kolmo-
gorov visiting Roma and wanting to meet de Finetti.
E: In 1962 Kolmogorov was awarded the Balzan
prize for Mathematics, the other awardees being
Pope Giovanni XXIII for Peace, Paul Hindemith for
Arts, Samuel E. Morison for Humanities and Karl
von Frisch for Biology. Two well-known mathemati-
cians, Gaetano Fichera and Olga A. Oleinik, went to
collect him at the Roma airport and asked him what
they could do for him. And, as Fichera reported, his
answer was, “If you know him, then you should or-
ganize a meeting with de Finetti.”
A and I: De Finetti’s papers are scattered with
brilliant ideas, sometimes only sketched. What are
the aspects of de Finetti’s work which still need to
be developed?
E: As for some specific topics, such as exchange-
ability and processes with independent increments,
in my opinion most of his ideas have already been
extensively developed and not much is left to in-
vestigate in the precise direction he had originally
thought of. On the other hand, I believe that much
is still left to investigate on the general foundations
of probability theory that emerge from his work and
that he strongly supported. These studies might have
a relevant impact in statistics, in physics and in
other research areas. The advances I am thinking
of concern both the interpretation of probability and
the enlargement—along with its mathematical impli-
cations—of the class of admissible probability laws
to include also the finitely additive ones.
5. PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN ITALY
A: You investigated quite extensively the devel-
opment of statistics and probability in Italy in the
first half of the 20th century (e.g., Regazzini, 2005).
Can you tell us about it?
E: In contrast to what happened in the Anglo–
American world or in Russia, in Italy probability
and statistics developed along almost separate paths.
Probability started growing in mathematical envi-
ronments. As far as I know, the first to deal with
the topic in a comprehensive way was Guido Castel-
nuovo, a famous mathematician who was mainly
doing research in algebra and geometry. His 1919
book on probability (Castelnuovo, 1919) was used as
a textbook for quite some time in those few math-
ematics degrees where probability was taught. The
interpretation of probability was frequentist, in line
with a view that would have been later shared also
by Fre´chet, Le´vy and Kolmogorov, and covered re-
sults of the Russian school up to Andrey Markov
and Aleksandr M. Lyapunov. Already, back in 1915
he had the idea of setting up a school of statistics
and actuarial sciences at the University of Roma,
which was then created in 1927. It had consider-
able success with many enrolled foreign students and
then became a proper faculty in 1936 with Gini. In
the preparation of his book Castelnuovo was helped
by Cantelli, who is considered, also at an interna-
tional level, one of the first modern probabilists. He
derived, among other contributions, versions of the
laws of large numbers, the Borel–Cantelli lemma,
a mathematical theory of risk that was named after
him, and developed an autonomous abstract meas-
ure–theoretic theory of probability, which appeared
before Kolmogorov’s. It is interesting to recall that
in this last development a crucial point was the
proof of the existence of measurable maps defined
on [0,1], endowed with the uniform distribution, in
such a way they have prescribed probability laws:
such an approach also reflects the idea of adher-
ing to the classical definition of probability due to
Laplace. Anyhow, this problem led him and his stu-
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dents to anticipate at least part of what is nowa-
days known as the Skorokhod representation. A dis-
tinguished scholar who obtained important results
along the lines of research undertaken by Cantelli
was Giuseppe Ottaviani, who is also known for his
inequalities that are related to Cantelli’s theory of
risk. Francesco G. Tricomi, eminent analyst and
friend of Cantelli, also gave some contributions to
probability as did Carlo E. Bonferroni, who is well
known for his inequalities.
A: Given such a glorious tradition, it is quite sur-
prising, as you said earlier, that the first full profes-
sors in probability were appointed by Italian univer-
sities only in the 1970s, with the notable exception
of de Finetti.
E: Actually, at the beginning of the 1970s only
two professors in probability were recruited, namely,
Giorgio Dall’Aglio and Giorgio Letta. Dall’Aglio was
at the Faculty of Statistics in Rome and was a mem-
ber of the before mentioned group led by Pompilj.
Letta is from Pisa and spent several research periods
in Germany and France. The latter experience stim-
ulated collaborations between Italian probabilists—
some of whom were Letta’s students—and French
probabilists in Paris and Strasbourg, a fruitful trend
which is still ongoing. Then a larger group of people
were appointed at the end of the 1970s in various
Italian universities.
I: And what about statistics?
E: In the last three decades of the 19th century,
topics that are today ascribed to Mathematical Sta-
tistics were taught in geodesy or astronomy courses.
Lectures by a not well-known Italian mathemati-
cian, Paolo Pizzetti, were very interesting and con-
tained some innovative ideas on significance tests.
More conventional, at least according to the Ital-
ian framework, statistics courses were in law facul-
ties: many academic statisticians actually had a de-
gree in law. Most of them were involved in Offi-
cial statistics and it was therefore natural that the
interactions between statisticians and probabilists
were rather limited. The first modern Italian statis-
tician was Rodolfo Benini, who had a law degree
from the University of Pavia and developed statisti-
cal methods for demographic, sociological and eco-
nomic problems around the end of the 19th and the
beginning of the 20th century. I recall once I came
across historical documents presented in notewor-
thy conferences of the American and British Eco-
nomic Societies where Benini is referred to as one of
the founders of econometrics. I think this due to his
analysis of income and wealth distributions and to
the pioneering use of multiple regression methods to
estimate, for example, demand curves. He also had
the idea of studying contingency tables with fixed
marginals. Among his successors, the main figure is
certainly Gini, also a graduate in law. His method-
ological contributions to statistics were praiseworthy
and were later studied not only in relation to mere
data analysis. Gini dominated Italian statistics un-
til his death in 1965 and created a school of faithful
followers. A prominent group of scholars was led by
Pompilj at the Faculty of Statistics in Roma. As
I recalled earlier, Dall’Aglio was one of its members
and he obtained noteworthy mathematical results
that can be traced back to the Ginian analysis of
statistical relationships. His results, however, have
a remarkable independent interest: for example, he
provided a relevant contribution to the definition
and to the properties of what is today known as the
Wasserstein distance. See Dall’Aglio (1956).
A: You mentioned Paolo Pizzetti who seems to be
a neglected figure within the Italian statistics com-
munity, was he not? We have never heard of him in
our statistics courses.
E: Yes, he was unfairly neglected. His contribu-
tions, which appeared in the 1880’s, were very inno-
vative and relied on an original approach that some-
how anticipated a few distinguishing ideas lying at
the foundations of statistics as set forth by Karl
Pearson and by Ronald A. Fisher. As an example,
he proposed procedures that were very similar to the
significance tests Fisher would have later adopted as
a distinctive feature of his methods. Pizzetti also had
remarkable mathematical skills that allowed him to
determine the exact distribution of certain statis-
tics used for data analysis. And he was well aware
of the results achieved, in this direction, by a Ger-
man geodesist Friedrich R. Helmert. He reproved
Helmert’s results with the aim of extending them
and relied on innovative methods and techniques
that Fisher himself would have later proposed in-
dependently. This is very well documented in a re-
cent historical monograph by Anders Hald. As you
can easily guess, Pizzetti’s ideas were totally dif-
ferent from those that Gini would have later ex-
pressed apropos of the Fisherian tests. Indeed, Gini
was very critical about the use of significance tests
and his criticisms were shared by de Finetti. This
may partly explain why Pizzetti is not known by
many statisticians. His work was somehow consid-
ered as heterodox for quite some time, as demon-
strated by the 1960s reprint of Pizzetti’s 1892 book
(Pizzetti, 1963). In the preface, written by V. Castel-
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lano, P. Fortunati and G. Pompilj, it is claimed that
parts of Pizzetti’s work were “misleading and. . . con-
tained errors that had been masterfully pointed out
by Gini in Gini (1939).” And the “misleading parts”
they were referring to are exactly those where Pizzet-
ti uses his results for devising statistical tests.
A and I: The excerpt you read can partly explain
the isolation of the Italian statistics community in
those years.
E: It partially does. Indeed, I think that Gini’s
critical remarks make sense. The point is that they
were not complemented by alternative proposals that
could take his concerns into account. Hence, it was
almost inevitable that Gini’s position would have
become marginal and isolated within the broader
international community. It should be recalled that
isolation fitted very well with the political climate
favoring autarkic tendencies during the fascist regime
and it unfortunately further consolidated over the
years in the Italian statistics community, at least
in academia. This obviously had a long-lasting neg-
ative impact, from which Italian statistics started
recovering only in the 1970s.
A: Gini was appreciated both for his scientific
achievements and for his praiseworthy services as
a scientific expert within various important Italian
institutions.
E: Definitely. He was founding President of the
Italian Central Institute of Statistics in 1926 and set
up first the School and then the faculty of statis-
tics, demographic and actuarial sciences in Roma
in 1936. He was in constant contact, also meeting
him in person, with Mussolini, who used to pay at-
tention to statistical analyses for taking decisions
on policy issues. For example, he acted as a tech-
nical advisor within the programs of demographic
and eugenics policies pursued by the fascist regime.
Later he also founded the Italian Statistical Society,
of which he has been President for 20 years. Besides
the scientific and institutional authoritativeness he
gained in Italy, it should be recalled that he ob-
tained countless recognitions abroad as well. Among
them I could mention that he became Honorary Fel-
low of the Royal Statistical Society, Vice President
of the International Sociological Institute, and Hon-
orary Member of the International Statistical Insti-
tute. In 1920 he was the founding Editor of the jour-
nal Metron, which published papers by many emi-
nent statisticians of the time, such as R. A. Fisher,
A. A. Chuprov, A. J. Lotka, S. S. Wilks, E. E. Slut-
sky, S. Kullback, H. Wold and A. L. Bowley.
I: We have also heard of some funny stories about
Gini bearing ill-luck. Can you tell us something more?
E: Yes, this is somehow true, but it is to be con-
sidered within the typical Italian attitude of mak-
ing fun of powerful people, as Gini certainly was.
There are various minor anecdotes and a dramatic
episode that would allow to conjecture a “correla-
tion” of the type you are referring to. As for the lat-
ter, something incredible happened in 1927: he was
on the steamboat “Princess Mafalda,” which ship-
wrecked off the Brazilian coast between Salvador de
Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, and he was among the
few survivors, the “legend” says thanks to his row-
ing skills, a sport he had practiced in youth. A less
dramatic and funnier story I have heard of concerns
an episode where, chatting with a colleague of his, he
paid a compliment to a young female student’s legs
whom they met on the stairs: after a few steps she
fell down and broke her leg. I remember that Otta-
viani did not mention his name, he referred to him
as the unnamed, since mentioning his name could
have led to something bad happening. All kidding
aside, after the shipwreck in Brazil, he criticized the
Italian authorities for the poor assistance from the
Italian Navy and, more in general, from the Ital-
ian government. These complaints caused him a lot
of troubles with the fascist regime in Italy. He had,
indeed, a strong and straight attitude that helped
him to protect scientific matters and appointments
from political influence. Of course, this position at-
tracted the aversion of many Fascist party officials
who strove for Mussolini to remove him as presi-
dent of the Italian Central Institute of Statistics.
And his criticisms on the occasion of the shipwreck
were added to the list of Gini’s “offences” to the
regime that led to his resignation in 1932. How-
ever, as I said before, he kept collaborating with the
regime as a scientific expert in demography, statis-
tics and eugenics.
A: Cantelli, de Finetti and Gini were the tower-
ing figures in probability and statistics before World
War II in Italy. They were also completely different
characters. How did they get along?
E: Gini published de Finetti’s work on Mendelian
inheritance in Metron and offered de Finetti a job
at the Italian Central Office of Statistics before he
graduated. While at the Italian Central Office, de
Finetti was involved in a project for predicting the
evolution of the Italian population and crucially de-
signed all modeling aspects of the project. He then
wanted this to be credited as his contribution, but
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Gini was reluctant to do so. This episode is well
documented in one of the letters de Finetti wrote to
his mother and contained in the collection published
by his daughter that I have already mentioned. In
any case, at the end of his four year contract in
1931, de Finetti moved back to Trieste and started
to work for the insurance company Generali. The re-
lationship between de Finetti and Cantelli was quite
a difficult one, since they were in strong disagree-
ment on the interpretation of probability. Cantelli
did not want to hear anything about finite additiv-
ity and he also tried to prove that σ-additivity was
a necessary property.
I: In addition to Metron, there was also the Gior-
nale dell’Istituto Italiano degli Attuari (GIIA), which
was a top journal in statistics and probability dur-
ing the 1930s. Why have they both lost their inter-
national reputation since then?
E: The GIIA was established in 1930, the same
year The Annals of Mathematical Statistics pub-
lished their first issue. It was edited by Cantelli
and the most distinguished scholars of the time,
such as Crame´r, Fre´chet, Kolmogorov, Khintchine,
Le´vy, Neyman and von Mises, published fundamen-
tal contributions on it. World War II ruined every-
thing, since its publication was suspended and the
GIIA lost its elite status among the top probability
and statistics journals which, during and soon af-
ter the war, included The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, along with Biometrika and the Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society. The other Italian
prestigious journal, Metron, which was established
in 1920, paid a high price for the line of development
of Italian methodological statistics and actually al-
ready declined before the war.
A: In 1978 you actually published a very inter-
esting paper characterizing the Dirichlet process in
terms of linear predictive distributions (Regazzini,
1978) on the GIIA. Why did you decide this was
a suitable outlet for your paper?
E: After my discussions with Rukhin, the Dirich-
let process became a main ingredient of my research
agenda. In fact, I was dealing with risk premium
models, for insurance companies, which were linear
combinations of an empirical part and an expected
value related to some prior guess—they identify the
so-called credibility premium. I thought to revisit
the problem coherently with the predictive distri-
butions generated by an exchangeable sequence and
asked myself what the underlying de Finetti mea-
sure was: it turned out to be the law of a Dirichlet
process. I wrote this paper while I was working with
Cifarelli on the distribution of linear functionals of
the Dirichlet process. I then presented it at a con-
ference, where Luciano Daboni, an editorial board
member of GIIA, was present: he liked the paper
a lot, invited me to give a seminar in Trieste and
proposed for me to publish it in GIIA. Some years
later the same result was independently obtained by
Albert Y. Lo (Lo, 1991).
I: During the 1980s you were probably one of the
few statisticians in Italy who published their papers
in international journals. Do you have any idea why
this happened at the time?
E: Well, first of all, most people, both in statistics
and probability, did not even try to submit their
work abroad. It was simply not necessary for the
progress in academic careers. Even many mathe-
maticians only published in Italian journals. Overall,
the need for trying to spread one’s own work at an
international level was not felt yet. Actually, it was
probably not even felt in the Anglo-American world:
it just happened that their journals then became
the “international” ones. By the way, papers that
were published in Italian journals with a very lim-
ited spreading were not all necessarily of bad qual-
ity. On the contrary, some of them are very well
known even abroad and contain innovative ideas.
Anyhow, in recent years things have changed sub-
stantially and young researchers submit their work
to the best international journals.
A: We, as students, have nice memories of sum-
mer schools organized by the Italian scientific com-
munity to support the spreading of probability and
statistics. You have been an active part of this ini-
tiatives.
E: After attending some of them as a student,
I have been involved several times in organizing and
teaching at summer schools that took place in var-
ious beautiful locations in Italy, such as Cortona,
Perugia, Livigno and Rheˆme-Notre Dame. In addi-
tion to being an opportunity to meet talented stu-
dents, summer schools also allowed me to get in con-
tact, and actually build up friendships, with some
authoritative scholars such as Alan Agresti, Patrick
Billingsley, Albert Y. Lo, Slava Sazonov, Henry Te-
icher and Jon Wellner. Unfortunately, the cuts op-
erated through the years by the Italian governments
have made it more difficult to sustain the organiza-
tion of such praiseworthy initiatives.
A: You then also started to collaborate with Sazo-
nov. In fact, one of your articles we really enjoyed
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Fig. 1. Patrick Billingsley with Eugenio in Cortona, Sum-
mer School, 1989.
reading, for the wealth of results and techniques it
offers, is Regazzini and Sazonov (2000). How did you
convince him to do research on Bayesian statistics?
E: Slava was a wonderful person I really miss. He
was a loyal friend to me and an extraordinary math-
ematician. I first met him at a conference at the
beginning of the 1990s and, then invited him to de-
liver a course, jointly with Albert Lo, at a summer
school organized by Bocconi University in 1992. He
then taught also in the 1993 and 1994 editions. We
started collaborating in 1996, while he was teaching
a course on “Probability Theory in Hilbert spaces”
at the Italian National Research Council in Milano.
Our first joint work concerned central limit theo-
rems for partially exchangeable arrays of random el-
ements taking values in a Hilbert space. At the time
I was also preparing my lectures for a Ph.D. course
on Bayesian nonparametrics to be taught in Roma
and I was dealing with the problem of estimating
a statistical model by means of a mixture of Dirich-
let processes. Such a problem was suggested by Di-
aconis and Ylvisaker (1985): with Slava we showed
that it is possible to construct a mixture of laws of
Dirichlet processes that approximates the distribu-
tion of any random probability measure, with re-
spect to the topology of weak convergence. And we
have been able to obtain, under suitable assump-
tions, the corresponding approximation bounds for
the posterior measures. These results were presented
at the 1st Workshop on Bayesian nonparametrics
that took place in Belgirate (Italy) in 1997. While
we were working on this paper, my mother became
seriously ill and Slava has been very important in
supporting me in such a difficult period.
I: You have always had good relationships with
probabilists and statisticians from Russia. For exam-
ple, Ildar Ibragimov is another good friend of yours
who has been several times in Pavia contributing to
the Ph.D. program. I had the pleasure to attend his
lectures and really enjoyed them.
E: It was actually Slava who suggested I contact
Ildar Ibragimov. In fact, I had asked Slava indica-
tions for possible instructors for Ph.D. courses. And
Slava mentioned about Ildar and told me that in
addition to being a great scientist he was an excel-
lent teacher. Of course, I knew Ildar by fame and
I feared he would have not accepted my invitation
but he did. I got the chance to meet in person not
only a brilliant mathematician but also a wonderful
person. His courses in Pavia were greatly appreci-
ated and I liked the fact that he, and also Slava,
was trying to adapt his lectures to the students’
background. Our Ph.D. classes are quite composite,
with most students having either mathematics or
economics degrees. The former typically have good
backgrounds in pure maths but not in statistics and
probability, whereas for the latter it is the opposite.
I remember Ildar asking me, “How come I have stu-
dents in my class who know about Radon–Nikody´m




A: Your papers with Cifarelli on functionals of
the Dirichlet process (Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1979,
1990) are probably your most well-known contribu-
tions to Bayesian nonparametrics. And it is amazing
how many connections your results have with a va-
riety of research areas such as combinatorics, math-
ematical physics, theory of stochastic processes, the
moments problem, and so on. Were you aware of
these?
E: As I said, our original problem was merely
of a statistical nature. From an analytical point of
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view, the task we were facing was very challenging,
but we were not aware of the connections with seem-
ingly unrelated areas of mathematics. We learned
about some of these relations thanks to the paper
by Persi Diaconis and Johannes Kemperman that
was presented at the Valencia meeting in 1994; see
Diaconis and Kemperman (1996). In addition to em-
bedding the whole problem in a wider mathemati-
cal context, it is also very well written and sketches
a few open problems; I strongly recommend reading
it. It is also thanks to this very same paper that my
work with Cifarelli gained some popularity.
I: The basic trick you resorted to was the inver-
sion of a Cauchy–Stieltjes transform for the mean
of the Dirichlet process. How did you arrive to this
intuition?
E: The procedure actually relied on the deter-
mination of recursive relations for the moments of
the linear functional. Such a strategy was inspired
by the work of M. Kac who used it to obtain the
well-known Feynman–Kac formula; see, for exam-
ple, Kac (1949). This closeness is further revealed by
the adoption, in our paper, Cifarelli and Regazzini
(1979), of the same symbols used by Kac! Cifarelli
had successfully used it to establish a closed form
expression for the probability distribution of the in-
tegral of the absolute value of the Brownian bridge
in Cifarelli (1975). These recursive relations we ob-
tained allowed us to determine the Laplace trans-
form whose iteration yields the Cauchy–Stieltjes
transform. We then resorted to the inversion formu-
lae of the Cauchy–Stieltjes transform to deduce an
exact form for the probability distribution of a lin-
ear functional of the Dirichlet process. Most of these
ideas were already contained in Cifarelli and Regazz-
ini (1979). In Cifarelli and Regazzini (1990) we basi-
cally completed that paper and provided some fur-
ther insight.
A: More recently you developed an alternative
method based on an inversion formula for the char-
acteristic function.
E: The approach you are referring to was inspired
by the representation of the Dirichlet process as the
normalization of a gamma process that was first
pointed out by Ferguson himself in his 1973 paper.
This representation combined with a suitable inver-
sion formula led to new forms for the probability dis-
tribution of the mean of a Dirichlet process, which
are recorded in a paper with Alessandra Guglielmi
and Giulia Di Nunno. I have then extended, with
the two of you, the approach to deal with means of
random probability measures induced by the nor-
malization of a generic process with independent in-
crements.
I: At the moment, Bayesian nonparametric regres-
sion is a hot topic. In this respect, a paper of Ci-
farelli and yourself has been recently “rediscovered”
(Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1978). Can you talk to us
about its origin and contents?
E: The original goal of our research was to de-
termine a probability distribution for partially ex-
changeable arrays of random elements. In particular,
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Fig. 3. Workshop on “Recent developments in exchangeability,” Cortona, October 1991. Among others, Luigi Accardi, Do-
nato M. Cifarelli, Guido Consonni, Persi Diaconis, Joe Eaton, Colin Mallows, Jan von Plato, Maurizio Pratelli, Wolfgang
Runggaldier, Marco Scarsini, Brian Skyrms, Fabio Spizzichino, Piero Veronese, Wolfgang Woess and Eugenio.
Fig. 4. From the left: Alan Agresti, Eugenio and Slava
Sazonov in Livigno, Summer School, July 1993.
we were looking for a solution that could be treated
analytically, while avoiding the independence assump-
tion among rows. These were the two reasons which
led us to the idea of resorting to the mixture of prod-
ucts of Dirichlet processes. We have been able to de-
termine the associated system of predictive laws and
the distribution of vectors of functionals. In a para-
metric setting, partial exchangeability had been in-
corporated in a paper by Lindley and Smith (Lind-
ley and Smith, 1972). I then used our model to study
credibility formulae with collateral data. Cifarelli
had also developed the model for applications to
ANOVA and linear models, the latter in collabora-
tion with Marco Scarsini and Pietro Muliere. We did
not even submit the paper to a journal, since, as
I said, at the time a technical report or a journal
publication counted the same for us. Nowadays, I am
really pleased to see the recent explosion of propo-
sals on dependent nonparametric models, somehow
in the spirit of our 1978 paper, developed by S. Mac-
Eachern, P. Mu¨ller, D. Dunson and many others.
I: In our opinion, the work of two probabilists,
John F. C. Kingman and Jim Pitman, has to be
listed among the main and most far reaching con-
tributions to Bayesian nonparametrics, even if not
directly focused on it. Do you share this view?
E: I am strongly in favor of a Bayesian approach
that solely relies on the specification of distributions
for observable random elements. Therefore, in gen-
eral, I like all those contributions and tools that aim
at providing systems of predictive distributions re-
lated to modeling and applications. These do not re-
sort to conditional distributions, given parameters
(either finite or infinite-dimensional) that in some
applications would be devoid of any empirical mean-
ing. And, the works by Kingman and Pitman, al-
though originated in different research areas, have
an important impact on Bayesian statistics. Even
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Fig. 5. Slava Sazonov and Patrick Billingsley (on the left) and Eugenio and Andrew Rukhin (on the right) with some students
in Rhemes-Notre-Dame, Summer School, July 1994.
though I read their papers only recently, I have ap-
preciated them very much since they open up the
possibility of implementing the Bayesian paradigm
in the direction I lean toward.
6.2 Exchangeability
A: The contributions of Kingman and Pitman you
just mentioned are closely related to exchangeabil-
ity, a topic you extensively worked on both from
a statistical and probabilistic point of view.
E: My interest in exchangeability was stimulated
by reading de Finetti’s papers. The first place where
I came across the statement of de Finetti’s represen-
Fig. 6. From the left: Giorgio Dall’Aglio, Henry Teicher and
Eugenio in Perugia, Summer School, August 1995.
tation theorem was the monograph by Loe`ve. But
I could not understand its statistical implications.
I could appreciate its relevance for inductive rea-
soning only through a careful study of de Finetti
Fig. 7. Eugenio in Belgirate, 1st Bayesian Nonparametrics
Workshop, June 1997.
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Fig. 8. From the left: Donato M. Cifarelli, Persi Diaconis
and Eugenio at Stanford University, July 2002.
(1930a, 1937a): in my opinion, these papers really
stand out in terms of conceptual and mathemati-
cal rigor and effectiveness in highlighting the role of
exchangeability for induction, and remain unbeaten
to date. Of course, the modern uses of exchangeabil-
ity and the key role it plays in modeling a variety
of phenomena are probably beyond what de Finetti
could have expected.
I: You have also been working on characterization
theorems in this context.
E: You are probably referring to results I have ob-
tained with Sandra Fortini and Lucia Ladelli and
that characterize systems of predictive distributions
associated with exchangeable sequences of random
elements. I have also noted that these kinds of re-
sults have recently attracted more and more interest
in Bayesian nonparametrics practice. Another in-
teresting characterization was obtained in a paper
I coauthored with Giovanni Petris where we dealt
with exchangeability in the presence of finitely ad-
ditive probabilities: we stated and proved a weak
version of the representation theorem that reduces
to the celebrated de Finetti theorem (strong version)
if one specializes to the case of σ-additive probabil-
ities. In this situation, we were also able to use the
representation theorem to show existence of a ran-
dom probability measure defined by means of a sys-
tem of finite-dimensional distributions agreeing with
Ferguson’s framework.
I: You have also provided nice contributions to the
investigation of properties of partially exchangeabil-
ity.
E: Indeed, I have been, and I still am, interested
in forms of dependence more general than exchange-
ability, as witnessed by some contributions I have
already mentioned before, such as the paper on mix-
tures of products of Dirichlet processes or the for-
mulation of a central limit theorem for partially ex-
changeable arrays. Besides these, I wish to men-
tion a nice characterization of partially exchange-
Fig. 9. Jon Wellner and Eugenio with some students in Cortona, Summer School, August 2004.
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Fig. 10. Eugenio at a conference on “Non–linear PDEs: homogeneization and kinetic equations,” Wien, June 2006. In the
picture, among others: Peter Markowich, Pierre Degoud, Eric Carlen, Maria C. Carvalho, Ester Gabetta, Giuseppe Toscani,
Cristian Ringhofer, Anton Arnold and George Zubelli.
able arrays that has been established in a paper
I wrote with Fortini, Ladelli and Petris. Indeed, we
proved a conjecture formulated in de Finetti (1959),
according to which a suitable random matrix re-
lated to the transitions of a recurrent process is
partially exchangeable if and only if the law of the
process can be represented as a mixture of laws of
Markov chains. Moreover, we have been able to show
that de Finetti’s definition of partial exchangeabil-
ity is equivalent to the one provided by Diaconis and
Freedman in a couple of papers they wrote in 1980.
6.3 Subjective Probability
I: In some of your work you have also provided
some insight into an approach to Bayesian statisti-
cal inference based on finitely additive conditional
probabilities.
E: I started getting involved into research on fini-
tely additive conditional probabilities after reading
some papers by R. Scozzafava in the first half of
the 1980s. In fact, I grew convinced that count-
able additivity was not justifiable—as a necessary
condition—unlike finite additivity which is neces-
sary for the validity of de Finetti’s coherence prin-
ciple. Therefore, finitely additive probabilities have
to be considered as admissible and I became inter-
ested in revisiting known results in probability as
particular cases of the finitely additive framework.
In particular, I found the interpretation of the def-
inition of conditional probability, as given by Kol-
mogorov, unsatisfactory. Conditioning is based on
classes of events that partition the whole sample
space and that become finer and finer: conditional
probability is then obtained through a limiting pro-
cess in terms of a Radon–Nikody´m derivative, and
depends on the class of events one conditions on.
In de Finetti’s approach, a conditional probability,
given an event, is defined through a natural, and un-
avoidable, strengthening of the coherence principle.
De Finetti himself had hinted at such a possibility,
without developing his idea in general mathemati-
cal terms. I tried to make this more explicit in some
papers I wrote during the 1980s in Regazzini (1985,
1987). These topics have been object of further in-
vestigation by my friends P. Berti and P. Rigo. An
important point is that many situations that ap-
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Fig. 11. IMS President Jim Pitman with Eugenio at the
IMS Fellows Ceremony, 70th IMS Annual Meeting, Salt Lake
City, July 2007.
pear as paradoxical if one refers to Kolmogorov’s
conditional probabilities can be justified within the
finitely additive framework.
A: Can you provide us with an example?
E: The most well-known is probably Borel’s para-
dox. Indeed, if a uniform distribution on the sur-
face of a sphere is defined, with respect to a specific
choice of geographic coordinates (namely, latitude
and longitude), one would expect that the condi-
tional distribution for latitude, given a fixed longi-
tude, is uniform. However, this does not happen in
Kolmogorov’s framework. In de Finetti’s approach,
instead, one can adopt the more intuitive probabil-
ity assessment even if it would be nondisintegrable.
The reason for such a behavior can be traced back
to the specific notion of conditional probability ac-
cording to Kolmogorov’s approach, since it does not
admit the evaluation of the probability of an “iso-
lated event” with probability zero. On the contrary,
de Finetti’s setup is open to different solutions: in-
deed, disintegrability turns out to be not necessary
for coherence.
I: Another amusing aspect of finitely additive con-
ditional probabilities emerges from your work on
well-calibration of systems of predictive distributions.
E: Loosely speaking, well-calibration corresponds
to situations where the distance between weighted
averages of forecast probabilites and empirical ob-
servations converges to zero as the number of obser-
vations, and forecasts, increases. Kolmogorov’s the-
ory always yields well-calibrated predictions or fore-
casts. This corresponds to a somehow unrealistic sit-
uation in practice, since one would also expect cases
of not well-calibration. With P. Berti and P. Rigo we
were interested in checking whether the same was
true within de Finetti’s theory as well. Our curios-
ity to this problem was stimulated by a paper of
Phil Dawid (Dawid, 1982). The answer we got was
naturally affirmative for strategic conditional prob-
abilities. The term strategic was coined by Dubins
and Savage in their well-known monograph where
they resorted to de Finetti’s theory to solve quite
complicated measurability problems. Strategic con-
ditional probabilities do indeed preserve, in a finitely
additive setting, the disintegrability property that
characterizes Kolmogorov’s definition. As for well-
calibration, we were able to show that, beyond strate-
gic evaluations, there exist not well-calibrated co-
herent Bayesian predictors with positive probabil-
ity.
A:Many critics of de Finetti’s subjectivistic stand-
point in probability theory use, as an argument for
supporting their position, de Finetti’s sentence “prob-
ability does not exist.” What can be replied to such
objections?
E: First of all, one should consider the provoca-
tive nature of de Finetti’s sentence. Moreover, its
meaning should not be decontextualized. According
to de Finetti, if one wants to give probability an
objective meaning, one should prove its existence.
In other words, there should be an existence the-
orem, a clear proof of the existence of an object
termed “probability.” For example, the interpreta-
tion of probability as a limiting frequency cannot be
considered as a proof, even if just empirical, of its ex-
istence. Hence, he used the expression “probability
does not exist” just to make the point that proba-
bility has simply a subjective meaning. It is also to
be said that most of the criticism raised against sub-
jectivism basically refers to the contents of his two-
volume monograph, de Finetti (1970), which is, ac-
cording to its subtitle, “a critical introductory treat-
ment.” In my opinion, de Finetti’s position can be
better discussed by relying on his early works, which
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are more concise, go straight to the point and dis-
play more mathematical and formal details.
I: A noteworthy scholar who contributed to the
theory of finitely additive probabilities was Lester
Dubins. You were also a good friend of his and had
the chance to host him in Milano.
E: Dubins had been in Italy several times and he
delivered courses at summer schools. He was very
fond of Italy and, in the second half of the 1980s,
I invited him once to stay for a month in Milano.
We had discussions on various research topics. He
was the source of many ideas that I later devel-
oped in my research. In those years I was mainly
working on technical aspects of nonparametric in-
ference, whereas he could provide me with many in-
sights into theoretical issues related to finite addi-
tivity that turned out to be of great importance to
me.
6.4 Probabilistic Methods for Mathematical
Physics
A and I: You have lately become interested in
some problems in mathematical physics. How did
it happen?
E: Moving to Pavia in 1998, I joined a Mathe-
matics Department with a few internationally well-
known mathematical physics scholars. I started in-
teracting with them and at some point a colleague of
mine, Ester Gabetta, showed me some papers where
the Central Limit Theorem was used to describe the
convergence to equilibrium of the solution of certain
kinetic equations. In particular, I read two papers,
McKean (1966, 1967), that spurred my enthusiasm
for the topic. I tried to understand and extend the
connections with probability, and could count on the
collaboration of my colleagues to help me under-
stand the problem from the perspective of physics.
Furthermore, the encouragement from Eric Carlen
and Maria Carvalho has been important for pursu-
ing my research in this direction. In fact, they liked
our first results and suggested us to publish them
(see Gabetta and Regazzini, 2006): there we ob-
tained some identities that came in handy for later
developments of the work in this area.
A and I: Was this line of research as rewarding as
others you have pursued in your career?
E: I would say I am happy about what I have
achieved so far with my coauthors. Starting from the
Kac model, which is generally considered as a toy
model, we obtained some interesting results concern-
ing the characterization of the initial data in order to
gain convergence to equilibrium. We have also con-
sidered situations where the energy, interpreted as
the variance of the initial datum, is infinite and we
performed an analysis of the speed of convergence.
In these studies, I have also collaborated with Lucia
Ladelli and Federico Bassetti. Later, I have super-
vised the thesis of Emanuele Dolera, a Ph.D. student
in Pavia. This work has required a strong effort that
was rewarded by the achievement of a noteworthy
result proving the validity of a conjecture formulated
in the 1966 McKean paper. In the last 40 years many
scholars have worked hard with the aim of proving
it.
7. THOUGHTS ON FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES
AND RESEARCH IN STATISTICS
I: In some of the previous questions we have lin-
gered on the subjectivistic interpretation of proba-
bility. What is the most relevant impact this has on
statistics?
E: A crucial point to understand is whether it is
worth preserving an axiomatization based on count-
able additivity. Of course, I think it does not gener-
ally have a statistical justification that makes its use
necessary. If finitely additive probabilities are also
admissible, then a considerable number of results
in the literature should be revisited. I have already
mentioned that one should reconsider the definition
of conditional expectation. Moreover, a number of
limiting theorems should be reformulated in order
to account for this more general framework. These
issues are also of great relevance in statistics regard-
less of the approach, either frequentist or Bayesian,
one adopts.
A: Does this lead, among others, to a rethinking
of Bayesian procedures?
E: Indeed, Bayesian procedures are typically im-
plemented by assuming complete additivity and this
leads to assume some of its implications as neces-
sary. Let us consider, as an example, the Dirichlet
process. A well-known result is that the Dirichlet
process selects, almost surely, discrete probability
measures. However, such a property holds true for
the countably additive extension of the collections
of finite-dimensional probability distributions of the
process. There are other non σ-additive extensions
for which the Dirichlet process selects nondiscrete
distributions with positive probability. This points
to the fact that in statistical practice one should
avoid assessing a probability for objects devoid of
empirical evidence. For example, take the proposi-
tion stating that de Finetti’s measure is the law of
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the (almost sure) weak limit of the empirical distri-
bution: thus, it depends on infinitely many observa-
tions and concerns “transcendent”—in de Finetti’s
words—conditions not directly verifiable. The con-
clusion of such a proposition could be obviously false
with non σ-additive extensions. On the other hand,
the fact that de Finetti’s measure is the weak limit
of the low of the empirical distribution, as the sam-
ple size increases, is, in any case, true: in my opinion
this suffices with respect to sound statistical goals.
I think this is an important foundational aspect,
which is often neglected and should be further in-
vestigated.
I: Are you saying that one should have clear in
mind the different levels at which mathematics and
statistical applications operate?
E: More or less, that is what I mean. Indeed, it
is true that mathematics makes parameters inter-
pretable as limits of (or of functionals of) empirical
processes, but it does not automatically grant that
inference on them are legitimate.
A: Does this position contrast with the usual way
of presenting a Bayesian model as the combination
of a likelihood and a prior?
E: Let me start by making an important point that
reflects my view on statistics: if inference is seen as
a decision problem to be solved under uncertainty
and if one agrees that probability is a tool to resort
to, then there is no other choice but the Bayesian
approach. Nonetheless, I agree with what Diaconis
and Ylvisaker say at the beginning of their paper
Diaconis and Ylvisaker (1985): Bayesian statistics
cannot be reduced to the elicitation of a prior and
the automatic application of Bayes’ theorem. Hence,
I would give an affirmative answer to your question if
one conditions on unobservable quantities. But this
is not limiting the scope of Bayesian inference at
all. Indeed, one can think of inferential procedures
that can still be implemented in this more general
framework, even when unobservable parameters are
involved. The previously mentioned “weak” inter-
pretation of the de Finetti measure says that a prior
distribution can be viewed, in any case and with
no distinction between observable and not observ-
able parameters, as an approximation of the law of
a frequency distribution or of some functional of it.
Moreover, prediction can be carried out without re-
lying on the Bayes–Laplace paradigm: it is enough
to specify the system of predictive distributions con-
nected to the exchangeable sequence. And I have ap-
preciated very much the work by J. Pitman which,
in the spirit of de Finetti’s stance, relies on the pro-
posal of systems of predictive distributions that are
then proved to be associated to an exchangeable se-
quence.
A: I also guess that a subjectivist would not agree
on the notion of posterior consistency as a frequen-
tist validation criterion of Bayesian nonparametric
methods.
E: I have to admit that, besides the Bayesian con-
text, I am skeptical on the use of consistency in
a frequentist setting as well. On the one hand, these
limiting results are very neat and beautiful from
a mathematical point of view. But, on the other,
they lack a sensible statistical interpretation. This
is very well discussed in de Finetti (1970), Volume 2,
in the section devoted to the laws of large num-
bers where he motivates why results, such as con-
sistency, do not represent justifications of statistical
procedures under the assumption of stochastic inde-
pendence. The same can be said for the Glivenko–
Cantelli theorem. Of course, my position encom-
passes commonly used frequentist validation crite-
ria adopted in a Bayesian framework. A different
role must be attributed to approximation results,
like Central Limit Theorems or, also, the “weak”
interpretation of the de Finetti measure, for which
these concerns do not apply.
I: So, what are the kind of asymptotic problems
that you think are interesting for Bayesians?
E: The kind of results I like are those in the spirit
of Blackwell and Dubins (1962) where they inves-
tigate the phenomenon of the merging of opinions.
This is a very nice finding both from a mathemati-
cal and from a statistical point of view. On the one
hand, it is a general result valid even beyond ex-
changeability. On the other hand, it has a nice sta-
tistical interpretation for Bayesians since it hints at
the predominance of empirical findings over differ-
ent subjective prior opinions as the sample size or, in
other terms, the amount of information, increases.
Other results of great interest are those that cur-
rently are designated as Bernstein–von Mises type
theorems for the posterior distribution. It is worth
noticing that among the first contributions to this
topic there is also an important paper, Romanovsky
(1931), published on GIIA.
A: From what you said up to now on the inter-
play between Bayesian inference and de Finetti’s in-
terpretation of probability, a valuable research topic
would focus on the analysis of the asymptotic be-
havior of the predictive distributions.
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E: You are right. In my opinion, an important
issue to address is the analysis of the distance be-
tween the predictive and the empirical distributions.
Instead of looking at the limiting behavior, it would
be more interesting to analyze how such a discrep-
ancy changes for any sample size n and, a fortiori,
as n increases. Since the predictive can also be ob-
tained as a functional of the posterior distribution,
one can also gain some insight if one relies on con-
vergence theorems, which say that the posterior con-
verges, in some sense, to a distribution concentrated
on the limit of the empirical process. In this respect,
Bernstein–von Mises type results are useful.
I: You have had a large number of students, and
by now also descendants, working in many different
universities in Italy and abroad. In your opinion,
what is the background a statistics student needs to
perform well in nowadays research and what are the
topics you would suggest to pursue?
E: As I said earlier, I see statistics as inductive
reasoning under the supervision of probability the-
ory. Therefore, it is natural that I firmly believe
that statisticians should have a solid background in
probability: the more the better. However, a statis-
tician must also be able to think through the logi-
cal and philosophical aspects of what she/he is do-
ing. This concerns modeling, the understanding of
practical implications yielded by the mathematical
formulation that is used, and the interpretation of
results. Mathematical skills are not enough, logical
and conceptual rigor being a necessary complement.
One needs to be able to handle statistics since it is
a powerful instrument, which allows one to make
substantial steps forward, compared to traditional
deterministic procedures. Statistics can get you close
to the best solutions, avoiding overwhelming tech-
nical and mathematical difficulties that often arise
within deductive deterministic reasoning. The latter
approach lacks the flexibility of a learning mecha-
nism, whereas in the probabilistic framework every-
thing is kept under control: you have a law which
governs everything and, unless you change the learn-
ing mechanism, it allows one to learn from experi-
ence in a way that is transparent and controlled by
Bayes’ theorem.
A: In modern science the specialization of re-
searchers is constantly increasing. Even probability
and statistics, which have grown in close relation-
ship to each other, seem to be drifting apart.
E: You can observe the fragmentation of fields
all over the place. This phenomenon also originates
from an excessive specialization that characterizes
most undergraduate studies. The situation was, in
the past, quite different and there were many schol-
ars with a wide spectrum knowledge and diversi-
fied cultural and scientific interests. De Finetti and
Gini are excellent examples in this respect. That
said, fragmentation in research is unavoidable and
it would be unrealistic to try reversing it. It is just
a pity to see that it tends to create duplications and
repetitions, whereas a more cohesive scientific com-
munity could produce better results in a collective
effort. In statistics, Bayesian statisticians have kept
to themselves for some time in reaction to the then
mainstream statistics, which was certainly not in fa-
vor of Bayesian methods. Now with Bayes statistics
well-established, I note that younger generations are
more open to interactions with non-Bayesian, which
in my opinion is certainly beneficial. A different issue
is the specialization in education, which should be
contrasted to some extent because it precludes pos-
sible paths to future researchers. As I have already
said, every statistician should have a solid back-
ground in probability and every probabilist should
know the basics of statistics, which is a noble and
fascinating, at least to me, field of application of
probability.
I: How should, in your opinion, a good statistics
paper be structured?
E: Well, first of all the definition “good” is to be
considered with reference to the historical period.
Until some years ago theoretical papers were very
appreciated, whereas nowadays applied work plays
an increasing role thanks to the computational tools.
However, I think that, in general, different forms
of motivation are equally valid: an enrichment of
the available tools, an improvement over other ex-
isting contributions or a useful application are all
fine. However, in all cases it is crucial that the paper
is logically sound and coherent with its motivation.
This is essential since we write for the scientific com-
munity and not for the general public, which is an-
other job. For instance, I do not like methodological
papers, to which an illustration has been evidently
added only for editorial needs. A methodological
contribution can stand on its own if its motivation is
sound. While I was young I experienced some of the
last manifestations of Gini’s school, which as a rule
of thumb required publications to include data, a ta-
ble and a plot. To me this does not make sense.
I also do not like applied papers in which one sets
forth a model, analyzes a couple of data sets and
concludes that the model works well. Any so-called
empirical validation does not show anything and is
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not enough to assess the suitability of a model. In-
deed, there should also be a sensible methodologi-
cal motivation in the sense that one should explain
which features of a certain model make it more ap-
propriate for the problem at hand.
A and I: Moving away from statistics and proba-
bility, we already mentioned your passion for music.
How did you get fond of music and what else are
you interested in when you do not do research?
E: Being born in Cremona, my passion for music
is quite natural: it is 20 km away from the places
Giuseppe Verdi grew up in, melodrama is popular
and there is a great tradition. It is also the home-
town of Claudio Monteverdi and of Amilcare Pon-
chielli, two famous composers. Last but not least,
it is the town of lute makers, the most renowned
being Antonio Stradivari. Even the general public
knows opera very well. Then, starting from opera
when I was young, my interest extended to sym-
phonic music. I have also been fond of visual arts
since I was a kid: I loved paintings, architecture and
sculpture since I related them to Italian history. I re-
member having a great teacher at school who used
to emphasize links between history, arts and litera-
ture. A peculiar feature of Italy is that, if you are
interested in any historical aspect, you necessarily
end up considering also painting, sculpture and ar-
chitecture since they are all intimately connected.
We obviously benefited from Christian culture that
played a fundamental role, after the fall of the Ro-
man Empire, in preserving the wonders inherited
from classical Greek and Roman traditions and in
promoting arts in forms we can today admire while
visiting churches, historical buildings, squares and
museums. Moreover, during the Renaissance, there
were a large number of small states and many of
them had patrons who liked and could afford being
surrounded by artists. Hence, many towns developed
their peculiar artistic heritage.
A and I: Eugenio, thanks a lot for patiently an-
swering all our questions.
E: Thanks to you for listening to all this!
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